Las elecciones del MNDFL siempre han estado limitadas por las cuotas, la manipulación de las nominaciones y el uso indebido de la información de los votantes, y las amplias violaciones de las leyes y los principios electorales. Ahora, con máquinas de votación como Dominion Voting, nuestras elecciones son peligrosamente defectuosas. Las cuotas de votantes dieron como resultado funcionarios muy poco representativos, especialmente en los cargos federales y constitucionales. Debemos hacer que las elecciones vuelvan a ser seguras y justas

Actualmente estamos en la temporada de primarias (asegúrese de registrarse en línea en http://sos.state.mn.us antes del 21 de julio). Me gustaría discutir con su comunidad lingüística algunos de los temas clave relacionados con las elecciones primarias del 9 de agosto para Secretario de Estado de Minnesota.

Este mensaje de abajo fue publicado el 28 de julio de 2020 en español por el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, CISA. Pero cuando la campaña de Donald Trump intentó examinar las máquinas, la gente dentro de la Casa Blanca, incluido Bill Barr, lo atrapó. Eso fue revelado recientemente por el comité de Bennie Thompson.

"Cuando adecuados planes de control y de respuesta a incidentes no se ponen en práctica, los ataques cibernéticos a la disponibilidad de los sistemas estatales o locales que permiten la inscripción de votantes en el día de las elecciones, el registro en los centros de votación o el voto provisional, también pueden potencialmente convertirse en un riesgo significativo a la capacidad de las jurisdicciones para llevar a cabo las elecciones." - Agencia de Seguridad de Infraestructura y Ciberseguridad

Ahora en Ingles, el informe completo del 28 de julio de 2020, la elección que Donald Trump ha rechazado

CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT TO ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Free and fair elections are a hallmark of American democracy. The trust of the people American on the value of your vote depends on your confidence in the security and resilience of the infrastructure that makes national elections possible. Therefore, an electoral process that is safe and resistant is of great national interest and one of the main priorities of the Security Agency of Infrastructure and Cyber ​​Security (CISA), from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of the United States. CISA is working jointly and in coordination with our federal partners [our counterparts], with those who are at the forefront of elections such as state and local governments, election officials, and vendors - in order to manage risks to the nation's electoral infrastructure. In this document, CISA assesses the risk to electoral infrastructure in order to help the electoral community understand and control the risk in their critical systems.

To carry out this work, the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) of CISA evaluated multiple criteria that quantify the scale of cyber risk to electoral infrastructure,including the preparation of the machines, the network of devices and the centralization of the components of
infrastructure. CISA's NRMC also evaluated additional risk criteria related to Voter Registration (enrollment), Voting Machines, and Electronic Submission of Ballots/Ballots/Ballots voting election.

CONCLUSIONES PRINCIPALES

MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Violations of the integrity of the statewide voter registration systems, the preparation of electoral data (for example, the scheduling of voting ballots/ballots/ballot papers), the vote tabulation systems and electoral websites present a specific risk in the capacity
jurisdictions have to carry out elections.

When proper control and incident response plans are not put in place, attacks to the availability of state or local systems that allow voter registration in on election day, registration at polling stations or provisional voting, they can also potentially become a significant risk to the ability of jurisdictions to carry out the elections.

Although voting systems are a high-profile target for threat actors, attacks at scale have a low probability of success, which means a lower risk of incidents in comparison with other components of the infrastructure of the electoral process.

The electoral systems of the United States are composed of diverse infrastructures and controls of security, and many systems invest significantly in their security. However, even those jurisdictions that apply the best cybersecurity practices are potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks by sophisticated cyber actors, such as nationwide actors.

Disinformation campaigns in conjunction with cyberattacks on electoral infrastructure can hinder electoral processes and undermine public confidence in election results.

ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS

The electoral infrastructure is made up of a diverse set of systems, networks and processes. The system electoral system in the United States does not refer to a single system, but to a set of multiple systems different. The electoral infrastructure ecosystem of each jurisdiction is a set of components different, some interconnected electronically and others not, and that must work together to carry out the elections. Although they perform the same functions, the processes and infrastructure of the system vary from state to state, and often differ even between counties, parishes, towns, or cities within a state or territory.

Electoral systems make use of various infrastructures and security controls. Even the jurisdictions that implement cybersecurity best practices are potentially vulnerable to attacks from sophisticated cyber actors, such as state-level advanced actors or national. Therefore, detection and recovery methods are just as important as safety measures as prevention.

Cyberattacks on the integrity of statewide voter registration, voter registration, and election websites, as well as ballot/ballot preparation, voting machines, voting and tabulation systems have the potential to cause the greatest functional impact to the ability of the jurisdictions to conduct the elections, based on the analysis of errors of the components of the electoral system in each phase of the electoral process. The following electoral infrastructure represents the systems, networks, and processes most critical to the security, integrity, and resiliency of
US elections:

Voter registration databases are used to enter, store, and edit information of the electoral register, such as the servers where the databases and portals are kept online that provide access. Voter registration is an ongoing process of building new records, updating existing ones and deleting obsolete ones. The databases of voter registration receive information automatically and indirectly (that is, through the manual entry) from a variety of sources, including other government agencies (for example, the Department of Vehicles and Motors) and organizations that assist in the process of registration (for example, voter registration drives). The databases contain information related to the right that a person has to vote or not, where they can vote and what style of ballot/single ballot they will vote on, based on the geographic location of the voter within multiple circles of political and fiscal districts.

Electronic and paper voter registers contain information about registered voters at polling places, and may be used to register voters where permitted by law. Before use, electoral registers must be prepared by transferring the information invoter registration database. Electoral registries have technological components and processing to view, edit and modify such voter registrations, electoral records. They may or may not be networked. The online electoral registries are connected to a database external database and may include a direct connection to the voter registration database or to a separate server. Offline voter registration records are on paper or they are static digital files located on computers.

Ballot/ballot preparation is the process of connecting geopolitics with races and candidates specific to each district, then translate those designs into unique combinations of ballot/ballot data. The preparation data of the Ballots/ballot papers take various forms, such as images on ballots/ballots electoral records (both in paper and electronic format), the data files necessary to build the images of the ballots/electoral ballots, the audio files for the ballots/ballots for special use and the specific files for export to external systems, such as websites or digital systems used in accordance with the Voting Law in Leave for Uniformed Personnel and Citizens Resident Abroad (UOCAVA, for its acronym in English). The preparation of ballots/electoral ballots also generates data necessary to the tabulation of the votes in a voting machine and the tabulation of the votes counted in a jurisdiction or in a state. This process is usually completed in an electoral management system.

Voting machine systems consist of technology and processes used to issue and, in some cases, generate the ballots/ballots of voters of all kinds (systems in
paper, and electronic systems, such as ballot/ballot marking devices and electronic direct-registration machines with or without a voter-verified paper audit). Voting machines encompass both the technology and the processes used by voting machineselection officials to prepare the voting machines for the tabulation of the ballots/electoral ballots and, in some cases, for presentation. Specifically, it includes the
uploading ballot/ballot files created during ballot preparation to voting machines. Voting machines are stored under the custody of officials
but after they are delivered, they are placed in the polling stations for use during the early voting and on election day. Voting machines are the way to most visible technology that voters interact with during the voting process.

Centralized vote counting and tabulation systems are used to tally votes shared by sub-jurisdictions such as counties, electoral districts and, in some cases, individual machines or even individual ballots/ballots. These systems collect and process data to determine the outcome of an electoral contest. Tabulation encompasses both the technology and the processes used to count the votes and aggregate the results. Vote tabulation processes include manual counting, optical ballot/ballot scanning, and direct electronic tabulation. Vote tabulation can be done at the electoral district level, in addition to centralized tabulation.

Official websites are used by election officials to communicate information to the public, including how to register to vote, where to vote (for example, search tools of precincts), and to transmit election results (e.g. reporting systems during election night). Sometimes election websites are under infrastructures that are owned by the government, but are often owned by commercial companies.

Storage facilities, which may be located on public or private property, and can be used to store voting and electoral system infrastructure prior to deployment.

Polling stations (including early voting locations) are places where voters Individuals cast their vote and may be physically located on public or private property.

Electoral offices are places where electoral officials carry out official their activities, including shared workspaces such as public libraries, municipal offices buildings, private homes and public areas of jurisdictions that do not have a specific workspace.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CYBER ATTACK ON THE ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The analysis determined that cyberattacks on each component of the infrastructure ecosystem elections can have different consequences, depending on the type of cybernetic impact and the component specific to the electoral system to which they are addressed.

Attacks on confidentiality, information theft.

Attacks on the integrity, modification of the information or functionality of a system.

Attacks on the availability, interruption or deprivation of use of the system.

The risks may also be different for the same component during preparation and during use. (for example, voting machines may be more accessible to cyberattacks during the preparation than on election day). Also, a successful cyber attack on a voting machine could also consecutively attack a tabulation or aggregation system if the software malign [malware] is transferred after the vote.

Table 1 provides a high-level overview with reference to the possible consequences of a successful cyber attack against every component of the system. This table does not directly address attacks cyber attacks aimed at diminishing public confidence in elections, although all three types of attacks could have as a primary or secondary objective to undermine that trust.

JOINT ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISINFORMATION ATTACKS

Foreign state and non-state actors take advantage of information activities as part of extensive campaigns to sow discord, manipulate public discourse and discredit the electoral system in order to weaken the pillars of democracy. In the context of elections, foreign entities have as objective:

Dissuade the target audience from participating in the electoral process through content that suggests that your votes don't matter, that abstaining from voting is the most democratic action, or through content that misleads voters about the voting process.

Influence the selection of candidates through, among other activities, the dissemination of content made-up and favorable about the favorite candidates, and made-up or demeaning content about the underdog candidates.

Harming the public perception of free and fair elections by disseminating content false or misleading information about electoral processes and results.

These disinformation campaigns, carried out in connection with cyberattacks on the electoral infrastructure, can hamper electoral processes and undermine public confidence in election results. Unauthorized network access enables surveillance and monitoring, and offers opportunities to perform devastating cyber attacks. Stolen or falsified information can be strategically transmitted to shape false narratives. Online kidnapping and misconfiguration or alteration of websites used by the public, can be used to influence the public opinion. Attacking government systems (even without compromise) can be used to form narratives that lead to mistrust of the government as administrator of the citizen information.

ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK CRITERIA

Based on these consequences, the evaluation applied multiple criteria that assess the scale of the cybernetic risk associated with the electoral infrastructure. The potential scale of a cyber attack on the electoral infrastructure is based on factors including whether the infrastructure is being prepared for use or if it is in use, if the technology of the infrastructure is networked and the degree of centralization of the infrastructure components. The risk criteria considerations are not mutually exclusive.

CISA also evaluates additional risk criteria related to voter registration,voting and electronic submission of ballots/ballots.

Attack Scale: System Readiness

The potential scale of a cyberattack on election infrastructure will be broader if a cyberattack happens during the preparation or programming of electoral infrastructure for immediate use. While a cyber attack on the integrity of a single voting machine in a polling place would affect that machine or enclosure, cyber attacks occurring during the preparation or central programming of machines in one jurisdiction may affect an entire jurisdiction using those machines. If the preparation of machines is carried out at the state level, cyber attacks during process of preparedness have the potential to affect an entire state. This is the case for a single choice.

However, malware placed on a single machine during its use could spread to the entire system of tabulation and preparation, and to all other machines for future elections if the jurisdictions do not implement best practices for using a secure electoral software system architecture.

During system setup, electoral jurisdictions rely on files from external sources, such as registration databases, voting system providers, ballot/ballot printers election officials or ballot/ballot schedulers.

Importing data from external sources poses a risk, as the sources may use systems connected to the Internet and that do not implement solid cybersecurity practices. In addition, an external source

can present a cyberattack vector against a wide variety of electoral jurisdictions if a single source serves multiple jurisdictions or states.

Attack Scale: Network of Systems

The scale of a cyber attack on election infrastructure has the potential to be broader if a attack compromises your network infrastructure. For example, in some jurisdictions electoral registers

Electronic devices are networked throughout the jurisdiction to facilitate the operation of polling stations, while in other jurisdictions electronic voter registers are not networked. A cyber attack on an individual non-networked polling station has less chances of spreading if the machine remains isolated from the network. An attack on the integrity of an online electronic voter registration has the potential to affect the entire jurisdiction, while a attack on the integrity of a local voting registry, not connected to the network, can be isolated in that specific polling place.

Therefore, we consider network connectivity for voting systems to be high risk. The creation and maintenance of airspace for critical systems, such as broadcast systems or tabulation of votes, is a recommended practice.

Una perspectiva de Minnesota sobre elecciones legales

El actual Secretario de Estado de Minnesota está vendiendo votos al mejor postor. El mejor postor es Ken Martin, presidente durante mucho tiempo del partido político Laborista Agricultor Demócrata de Minnesota. La versión de Ken de los demócratas, a su vez, vende nuestra república a grupos de interés: mujeres oprimidas por la creación de Dios del parto; personas que no descienden directamente de Europa: en Minnesota, suecos, noruegos, hispanos "blancos", finlandeses, alemanes, franceses, ingleses, británicos, irlandeses, galeses, escoceses, rusos, etc.; de bajos ingresos; y, como es bien sabido, en 2022, en las elecciones no presidenciales instantáneas, a los votantes ilegales en virtud de la Constitución de Minnesota.

Sí, Steve Simon, un típico legislador estatal de DFL que ganó las elecciones para reemplazar a Mark Ritchie de Georgia (a quien demandé en 2012-2016 por violar la Constitución al manipular las elecciones) no tiene principios y no respeta nuestro derecho de nacimiento como ciudadanos de este gran Estados Unidos. Y ahora ha encontrado su pareja: Dominion Voting. Este aliado de la corrupción fue finalmente acusado el 3 de junio de 2022 de proporcionar una máquina electoral fraudulenta, como detallo a lo largo de este sitio web.

Al mismo tiempo, la antigua Unión Soviética se ha desintegrado en la guerra: América, la gran República del Nuevo Mundo con tantas promesas excepcionales, Bendecida por Dios, se tambalea al borde. Puede ser víctima de muerte por elecciones corruptas. Nuestra Corte Suprema ha adoptado algunas posiciones basadas en principios, incluida la de Dobbs, que podría insuflar algo de vida y civilización a nuestra comunidad diversa y restaurar nuestra posición de liderazgo. La elección clave que puede salvarnos es esta: yo mismo, como líder independiente y demócrata en el estado, contra este sirviente del conglomerado nacional llamado "Demócratas", este decepcionante titular Steve Simon. El 9 de agosto lo dirá.

@realDonaldTrump using America's might to keep our land tight with national security steel tariffs. Please VOTE in @MinnesotaDFL August 14 primary to defeat @amyklobuchar. https://t.co/50W1NFaAD5 JOBS FOR MINNESOTA!

— Steve Carlson 2.018 (@SteveWCarlson) June 12, 2018

SOME BACKGROUND
In 2014 Minnesota's DFL and GOP, local branches of giant national parties, finally succeeded in destroying the Minnesota Independence Party, a thorn in their side, that stood in the way of their mutual self-dealing. But in 2016, it is the year of the independent voter. At least three members of the 2014 Independence Party slate, Carlson, Steve Williams and Bob Helland have chosen to invade the two national parties and directly challenge them in head-to-head primaries.

Why Ted Cuz "Leading from Behind" shenanigans violate 1st Amendment's free association requirement

Hillary has her own cheerleading section at the U.S. Supreme Court!

So Hillary is theoretically unbeatable. Bernie Sanders gallantly strives to attract Democrat women to socialism, but Hillary is a lock for the Democrat nomination, since the Democratic National Convention REQUIRES that a majority of all the delegates from each state be women--women who want the first woman. This practice is obviously unconstitutional. I'm running independent, and I ask Democrats to leave their party because of these corrupt practices and vote for me. My positions on the issues are better than Hillary's and I want to lead.

The motion challenging the IFP denial grounds of frivolousness has been distributed for conference on January 8, 2016. The motion is read verbatim on the video below, challenging the preliminary decision the Court would not address the Governor's illegal action backing Al Franken because to seek to make Governor Dayton follow the law and Constitution is supposedly "frivolous"

Tragically, the answer to this question is "no." Antonin Scalia died mysteriously months after pronouncing that the U.S. Supreme is "a threat to American democracy." As indeed it IS.